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Abstract 
This paper describes an experimental study involving the minimum effort game. 
In this game, each player faces a trade-off between risk and payoff. Within each 
group, half of the subjects were administered with vasopressin in nasal spray form 
while half received a placebo. We found that subjects who received vasopressin 
were more likely to play the minimally risky strategy in the group and less likely 
to focus on payoff levels than those who received the placebo.  
Keywords 
minimum effort  game; coordination game; neuroeconomic experiment; vasopressin 
1 Introduction 
When analyzing cooperation and coordination, we often find what is commonly 
referred to as subject effects; i.e., effects that only occur in certain laboratories or 
geographic regions (Hermann et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2001; Engelmann & 
Normann, 2010). Aside from the more obvious explanations for subject effects, 
namely cultural or genetic differences, several results have one fact in common: 
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subject effects often occur between southern and northern regions of the world. 
That is, the behavior of individuals who are based in countries that are bathed in 
enduring sunshine seems to deviate from that of individuals who are based in 
countries with short days. This observation is interesting from a neuro-economic 
perspective, and various studies have shown that the dissemination of hormones is 
driven by the amount of sun we encounter (Reppert et al., 1981; Windle et al., 
1992; Young, 2007). In order to better understand human behavior, therefore, we 
need to develop a deeper understanding of hormone-controlled motives. This 
paper describes an experiment that examined the impact that vasopressin, a 
neurohypophysial hormone, has on human behavior in the context of a 
coordination problem; namely, the minimum effort game. It is envisaged that the 
results of this research will enhance existing understanding of equilibrium 
selecton in coordination games.  
In the minimum effort game, which is also known as the weakest link game (Van 
Huyck et al., 1990), every player from a group of several players chooses his 
effort level. The effort level selected influences the potential payoffs of both, the 
group to which the player belongs and the player himself. On the one hand, the 
player faces costs and these increase according to the level of his effort; on the 
other hand, the payoff increases in accordance with the minimum effort in the 
group. In equilibrium, all players choose identical effort levels: choosing a higher 
effort level than the other group members only increases the costs of one player, 
not the minimum effort in the group. A lower effort level reduces the player’s 
own costs, but also the minimum effort level of the group. As the cost reduction 
achieved by lowering one’s effort lies below the benefit loss associated with 
decreasing the minimum effort, deviating from equilibrium by choosing a lower 
effort does not appeal. Similar to other coordination games, the minimum effort 
game offers a discrepancy between payoff maximization and risk minimization: 
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the lower the effort of a player, the lower his risk of being exploited by another 
group member choosing lower effort levels. However, the higher the individual 
effort, the higher the potential minimum and, therefore, the higher the potential 
payoff.  
In laboratory experiments that observe human behavior during the minimum 
effort game, two outcomes typically occur (Van Huyck et al. 1990):  
1. In small groups, all group members coordinate towards choosing the 
maximum effort level; i.e., play the payoff dominant equilibrium.  
2. In larger groups (about six players), all group members chose the lowest 
possible effort level; i.e., coordinate towards the risk dominant 
equilibrium. 
Most experimental studies have focused on the development of methods that 
ensure the payoff dominant equilibrium is played, even in larger groups. One 
popular approach involves increasing the information that is available about the 
effort levels of others. Initial work, such as that by Van Huyck et al. (1990) only 
communicated the minimum effort level in the group and the payoff of the player 
at the end of a period. However, later experiments also displayed the distribution 
of the individual effort levels in the group (Berninghaus & Ehrhart, 2001). In this 
way, even larger groups reach the payoff dominant equilibrium. However, the 
subjects need to be aware of the efforts of all other group members. If they are 
only aware of the effort levels of some of their peers, this does not result in the 
group playing the payoff dominant equilibrium (Deck & Nikiforakis, 2012). 
Another approach to promote the payoff dominant equilibrium in larger groups 
involves communicating the desired result. In an experiment in which the 
experimenter informed the participants that the desired result in the minimum 
effort game is to play the maximum effort, several large groups reached the 
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payoff dominant equilibrium (Chaudhuri & Paichayontvijit, 2010). Finally, 
competition can help to ensure high effort levels in larger groups. First of all, 
research has shown that the elimination of the weakest group member does not 
motivate all others to choose higher effort levels (Fatas et al., 2006). What helps, 
is competition with other groups. Namely, by increasing the payoff of all players 
in a group if they chose the highest minimum effort in a set of groups, increases 
the effort levels of all players and the likelihood that the group will reach the 
payoff dominant equilibrium (Bornstein et al., 2002). Unfortunately, intergroup 
competition on the long run only works for the winning group. That is, groups 
who do not perform better than the other groups (at least in some periods) end up 
in the low effort levels in the absence of intergroup competition (Riechmann & 
Weimann, 2008).  
Existing research also suggests that the cultural background of the subjects who 
are participating in the minimum effort game has a major impact on their 
behavior. Both the dissemination of individual effort levels and the 
communication of the desired result represent methods of identifying the “cultural 
norm”; that is, if all subjects in the population are aware of the norm their fellow 
group members will resort to, they will also follow this norm. Even the 
experiments on competition themselves can be perceived as a means of 
establishing a norm. By telling the members of a group they frequently have 
higher (lower) effort levels than the other groups, one implicitly communicates 
the norm of the group itself. All group members begin following the norm in their 
group by either lowering or increasing their effort levels. In this sense, it is not 
surprising that subject effects occur in the minimum effort game. For example, a 
minimum effort game conducted in Copenhagen, Denmark (Engelmann & 
Normann, 2010), revealed that the payoff dominant equilibrium was reached even 
in larger groups if enough Danish subjects participated. Compared to other 
- 5 - 
 
countries - namely, the United States, Israel and Spain - effort levels in Denmark 
are higher.  
The question arises, then, as to why the behavior of participants from Denmark 
differs from those from other countries and yields different experimental results in 
the minimum effort game.  
This paper describes a neuro-economic experiment that was designed to gain 
insights into how culture can affect behavior during the minimum effort game. 
When the experiment on cultural differences between Danish and other students 
(Engelmann & Normann, 2010) was conducted in November and December 2006, 
the days were short in Copenhagen, and people were exposed to sunlight for just a 
few hours per day. This influences the hormonal balance of subjects; namely, 
their levels of vasopressin are lower at night and, when confronted with daylight, 
vasopressin levels increase (Reppert, 1981). In addition, research investigating the 
impact of hormones, such as vasopressin, shows that hormones influence even 
complex human behavior (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2005; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 
2011). In particular, aggression is correlated with cerebrospinal fluid levels of 
vasopressin (Coccaro et al., 1998) and vasopressin increases reciprocity in the 
prisoners’ dilemma games (Rilling et al., 2012). Hence, the differences between 
the behavior of Danish people and other subjects as they play the minimum effort 
game may be the result of lower hormone levels. These differences in hormone 
levels might also influence the cultural norms established. 
We find that subjects who had been administered with vasopressin showed equal 
behavior during the first round of the minimum effort game as those who received 
a placebo. From that point forward, until the equilibrium was reached, subjects 
under vasopressin exhibited lower effort levels than those who received the 
placebo. These results are in line with the differences between Copenhagen and 
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other experimental labs. As the subjects in Denmark were exposed to less 
daylight, their vasopressin levels were lower. Hence, based on our experiment, we 
expect them to show higher effort levels which, according to the experiments in 
Denmark (Engelmann & Normann, 2010), does occur. 
We believe that this result has significant implications for economics. Existing 
literature supports the notion that cultural norms impact individual’s behavior in 
minimum effort games. If hormones, on the other hand, justify the observed 
behavior, are our norms consequences of hormonal levels or culture? 
2 Game  
In the minimum effort game conducted for the purposes of this study, a group of 
   players participated. Each player     	
   
  could choose his 
strategy; i.e., his effort,   	
 
  
. The payoff per player was  
  
  	  

     !. That is, the payoff of each player  depended on the 
minimum effort any of the players chose and the payoff of player . Table 1 
summarizes the payoff table.  
 
Table 1: Payoffs based on own effort and minimum effort of the group 
  Minimum effort of group (

 ) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Own effort () 
1 35 - - - - - - 
2 30 40 - - - - - 
3 25 35 45 - - - - 
4 20 30 40 50 - - - 
5 15 25 35 45 55 - - 
6 10 20 30 40 50 60 - 
7 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 
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In equilibrium, all players  choose identical effort levels . One can easily see 
this in the payoff table (see Table 1). Let us, for example, assume that all players " 
choose an effort level   . Now, all players receive a payoff of . If player  
chooses a higher effort level  # , his payoff will decrease to  when setting 
  , 40 when setting   $, and so on (see Column “4” in Table 1). That is, 
player  cannot increase his payoff by choosing a higher effort level than the other 
players. Similar observations hold if player  decreases his effort level to  % . 
Now, the new minimum effort level is . The payoff decreases to  when 
choosing   , 40 when choosing   , and so on. That is, player  cannot 
increase his payoff by unilaterally deviating from playing the same strategy as all 
other players. In consequence, the minimum effort game has && different 
equilibria – one equilibrium for every possible effort level. 
All equilibria form a natural order. On the one hand, every Nash equilibrium 
'
 
 
 ( is a payoff superior to every other Nash equilibrium '
 
 
 ( 
with  % . One can easily see this by looking at the payoff table in Table 1. Let 
us again look at the Nash equilibrium '


(. All equilibria with effort levels 
below  yield lower payoffs for all players. However, every equilibrium with 
higher effort levels yields higher payoffs for all players. Similarly, the Nash 
equilibria form an order concerning risk: for all effort levels, the average payoff is 
 given that all minimum effort levels are equally likely. However, the higher 
the effort level , the higher the potential loss of player  if one of the other group 
members chooses an effort level of 1 (see Column “1” in Table 1). That is, the 
lower , the less risky the chosen strategy. 
In sum, the minimum effort game offers a dilemma between payoff and risk 
dominance, as all 2x2-matrix coordination games do. If all subjects choose the 
minimum effort level, the overall payoff is minimal, while the risk of receiving a 
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lower payoff is low. The higher the effort level played in equilibrium, i.e., the 
higher the payoff of the players, the higher the potential loss if one of the group 
members deviates. In contrast to bi-matrix coordination games, the minimum 
effort game allows for different equilibria and, therefore, different levels of 
payoffs and risk. 
3 Material and methods 
A total of 148 healthy males (aged 20 to 35) participated in this research. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, each of the subjects was assigned to one of 37 groups of 
four people. Within each group, two subjects were treated with a placebo and two 
subjects were treated with vasopressin in the form of a nasal spray.  
Prior to the experiment, all subjects signed a consent form. Once they had done 
so, they received a nasal spray that contained 40 international units of either a 
placebo or vasopressin. The subjects then completed several questionnaires, 
including an aggression questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992); a mood 
questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997); and a questionnaire on risk preferences. They 
then read the instructions to the game. The experimenter answered any questions 
the participants had about the game and ensured that 30 minutes since drug 
administration had passed before the game commenced. This ensured that the 
vasopressin levels in those subjects who had been administered vasopressin 
reached peak levels in the cerebrospinal fluid (Born et al., 2002).  
All groups played the minimum effort game as described in Section 2. The game 
was iterated for 10 periods (computerized using zTree; Fischbacher, 2007). At the 
end of each period, all subjects were informed of the minimum effort chosen in 
their group. When the subjects had finished playing the minimum effort game, 
they filled out the same questionnaires they had completed prior to the game, and 
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then completed a fairness task. In the fairness task, the subjects were asked to 
choose one of five different allocations, with one allocation being a 50:50 
allocation between the subject and another random subject in the room, and all 
other allocations differing from this allocation by favoring the deciding player to 
another extent.  
After the subjects had finished all tasks, they were paid according to their 
performance in the minimum effort game. That is, each subject received 0.035 
SFR per point received as well as a show-up fee of 10.00 SFR. In addition, the 
fairness task was implemented for one random subject in the room. The average 
payoff per player was 30.46 SFR (minimum: 17.67 SFR, maximum: 43.75 SFR). 
On average, the experiments lasted one hour and 30 minutes. 
4 Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of vasopressin on the effort level subjects chose 
throughout the game. While effort levels did not differ between the subjects per 
group who received a placebo and the subjects who received vasopressin in the 
first period (Wilcoxon test, two-sided; means: p=0.193; minima: p=0.302), 
subjects treated with vasopressin gave significantly less in periods 2 (Wilcoxon 
test, two-sided; means: p=0.005; minima: p=0.008), 4 (Wilcoxon test, two-sided; 
means: p=0.014; minima: p=0.022) and 5 (Wilcoxon test, two-sided; means: 
p=0.030; minima: p=0.094). Starting in period 6, the subjects reached an 
equilibrium. After this period, no differences between the subjects was observed 
(Wilcoxon test, two-sided; means: p=0.674 (t=6), p=0.858 (t=7), p=0.300 (t=8), 
p=0.351 (t=9), p=0.332 (t=10); minima: p=0.904 (t=6), p=0.887 (t=7), p=0.861 
(t=8), p=1.000 (t=9), p=0.258 (t=10)). As such, on average, the mean effort levels 
selected over the course of ten periods of the weakest link game differed 
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according to whether the participant had been administered a placebo or 
vasopressin (Wilcoxon test, two-sided, p=0.006). 
 
Figure 1: Average and minimum effort per group and period 
The differences in the effort levels between the subjects who received a placebo 
and those who received vasopressin also resulted in differences in the payoffs (see 
Table 2). In terms of effort levels, the subjects who were administered vasopressin 
achieved significantly higher payoffs for periods 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Wilcoxon test, 
two-sided; means: p=0.005 (t=2), p=0.014 (t=4), p=0.030 (t=5)), while no 
difference in payoffs was observed during the other periods (Wilcoxon test, two-
sided: p=0.193 (t=1), p=0.203 (t=3), p=0.674 (t=6), p=0.858 (t=7), p=0.300 (t=8), 
p=0.351 (t=9), p=0.332 (t=10). Overall, payoffs were higher for the subjects who 
received vasopressin than for those who received the placebo (Wilcoxon test, two-
sided: p=0.006). 
 







	
      	 
  





 !
"!"#"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Table 2: Payoffs per group over all periods. Values in brackets indicate extent of differences 
between Placebo and Vasopressin players (positive: payoff vasopressin > payoff placebo) 
Grp. Payoff (Diff.) Grp. Payoff (Diff.) Grp. Payoff (Diff.) 
1 44.0 (4.5) 14 53.4 (0.0) 27 36.9 (-5.8) 
2 54.5 (3.0) 15 45.3 (2.3) 28 52.5 (2.5) 
3 41.0 (2.5) 16 50.6 (2.5) 29 53.0 (2.5) 
4 65.0 (0.0) 17 49.9 (-9.0) 30 53.5 (2.0) 
5 65.0 (0.0) 18 61.3 (2.5) 31 55.4 (4.3) 
6 64.1 (0.3) 19 61.5 (0.0) 32 41.3 (5.0) 
7 55.8 (-1.0) 20 54.0 (-1.0) 33 53.4 (0.3) 
8 48.0 (-3.0) 21 53.3 (0.5) 34 53.1 (3.8) 
9 54.5 (0.0) 22 55.3 (2.5) 35 64.1 (-0.3) 
10 43.0 (2.5) 23 53.4 (0.0) 36 21.9 (15.8) 
11 60.8 (1.0) 24 61.6 (-0.5) 37 55.5 (1.5) 
12 30.8 (6.0) 25 32.9 (1.0)     
13 65.0 (0.0) 26 60.9 (2.8) Avg. 52.2 (1.4) 
 
Analysis of the differences between individual effort levels and the minimum 
effort level of the group indicated that the relative frequencies of these differences 
tended to be different between placebo and vasopressin subjects (Chi-squared test, 
two-sided, p=0.082). In sum, the subjects who received vasopressin significantly 
more frequently chose the minimum in the groups than the subjects who received 
the placebo (Wilcoxon test, two-sided, p=0.027).  
 
Figure 2: Differences between own effort and minimum effort per group 
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Table 3: Regression analysis of the influencing factors on effort levels 
  Min. effort in t-1 Fairness preferences Risk preferences 
Intercept 5.377 (0.156)*** 5.309 (0.165)*** 4.520 (0.206)*** 
Vasopressin -0.273 (0.055)*** -0.271 (0.055)*** -0.250 (0.058)*** 
Min. effort in t-1 0.213 (0.029)*** 0.210 (0.029)*** 0.319 (0.033)*** 
Fairness preferences 0.149 (0.077)* 0.270 (0.083)*** 
Risk preferences 0.305 (0.159)* 
N 1152   1152   1152   
Marginal R2  0.09  0.08  0.18  
Conditional R2 0.48  0.49  0.51  
Note: Values stand for the estimate, values in brackets are standard errors and stars indicate 
significance levels with * : p < 0.10;  ** : p < 0.05 and *** : p < 0.01 
Next, the reasons for the differences in effort levels (see Table 2) was investigated 
by conducting regressions that were designed to predict the effort level of each 
subject in the current period. We controlled for repeated measures by estimating 
generalized linear mixed models. We found that it was not risk preferences, but 
vasopressin and fairness preferences, that influenced the observed effort levels the 
most. Namely, the minimum effort played in the previous period had a significant 
impact on the observed behavior, regardless of what other parameters we added to 
the regression. The same held for vasopressin. Adding only fairness preferences 
did not really improve the quality of the model (both marginal and conditional R2 
remained the same as with the estimate without the parameter). Only adding both 
fairness and risk preferences, to the estimate resulted in slightly higher R2. As 
such, the results indicated that fairness preferences have a strongly significant 
influence, while risk preferences have a minor impact. 
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5 Discussion 
We found that subjects in a minimum effort game chose different effort levels 
according to the drug they received, the minimum effort level in their group in the 
previous period and their fairness preferences. The remainder of this paper will 
examine the various aspects of this result. 
Impact of risk preferences: As motivated when introducing the minimum effort 
game, we expected risk preferences to have a significant impact on the observed 
behavior. Namely, as the subjects faced no risk when resorting to the minimal 
possible effort level, their risk of being exploited was maximal when they chose 
the highest possible effort level. However, according to our regression analysis, 
the impact of risk preferences on the chosen effort level was minimal. This result 
supports the notion that cultural norms impact the behavior of subjects. The 
subjects risk preferences, individual properties of the subject, did not seem to 
influence behavior. However, fairness preferences, subject properties that are 
definitely influenced by society, did influence behavior. 
Impact of sunlight: In the introduction to this paper, we discussed related 
literature that clearly shows that sunlight increases the levels of hormones in the 
human body. However, we were unable to completely exclude the impact of 
sunlight on the results of this experiment. As experimenters, we cannot control for 
the sunlight the subjects experienced during the hours prior to the experiment. We 
did everything to minimize this influence: (1) We conducted the experiment in a 
laboratory below ground level, such that only artificial light - which does not 
impact hormone levels - lit the laboratory; (2) The 30 minutes spent completing 
questionnaires prior to the beginning of the experiment served to reduce the 
impact of the sunlight the participants were exposed to prior to the experiment; 
(3) We ensured that subjects from both treatment groups (placebo and 
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vasopressin) sat in the same rooms (below ground level), at the same time and 
waited together prior to the experiment. In this way, we expected to minimize the 
impact of sunlight for the purpose of our treatment comparisons. 
Additional factors influencing hormone levels: Vasopressin levels are not only 
subject to sunlight, as stated in the introduction, but also to gender, day of 
menstrual cycle (Forsling et al. 1981), and other aspects. This study did not 
attempt to differentiate for each of these factors. To ensure our results were as 
universal as possible, we minimized the impact of such aspects. Namely, we (1) 
excluded most aspects by conducting the experiments with male subjects only, 
and (2) reduced the impact of sunlight. We leave the specific analysis of 
influencing factors on vasopressin levels to medical practitioners. Nevertheless, 
controlling for corresponding attributes would also be interesting in economic 
experiments. That is, one could repeat our experiments with subjects from both 
genders, compare the impact of daylight lamps; i.e. lamps mimicking the 
properties of daylight, and traditional lamps, and test female subjects at different 
stages of their menstrual cycle. 
Hormones and economic behavior: As we have shown, vasopressin plays a 
central role in the way the subjects behaved during the game and the decisions 
they made. As daylight influences the levels of vasopressin in the body, 
differences in the behavior of people between summer and winter, and in 
countries close to and far from the equator are likely. Based on our results, we 
argue that is not sufficient to conduct experiments in some countries of Europe, 
the United States, and Israel, but there is a requirement to place a stronger focus 
on reproducing experimental results throughout the globe; e.g., by accepting 
repetitions of existing studies for publishing. 
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